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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
CLASSIFICATION
Mova.bles and Immovables
In Chestnut v. Hammatt,' the plaintiff purchased a tract of
land and the improvements thereon. In dispute was the passing
of a refrigerated bulk milk tank and a vacuum pump, situated in
the dairy barn. The manner in which these things were con-
nected to the property was not of serious concern because they
were classified as immovables by destination under Civil Code
article 468. Belonging to the vendor-landowner, and being es-
sential equipment in the dairy operation, they constituted "other
machinery made use of in carrying on the plantation works"
within the meaning of the article. While still owner of both the
land and the improvements, the vendor could have de-immo-
bilized such improvements by alienation and removal, but not
by a disposition which left the improvements on the land with-
out any notice of the vendor's intent to exclude them from the
sale. Accordingly, they passed with the sale of the property to
the vendee.
In Industrial Outdoor Displays v. Reuter,2 the defendant pur-
chased a tract of land and resisted the plaintiff's demand for
permission to remove an outdoor advertising sign structure
which had been placed there under the terms of an unrecorded
lease with the prior owner. The structure consisted of two large
steel "H" beams imbedded in concrete together with sign faces
and other equipment fastened with bolts to the steel beams. The
trial court held that the steel beams had become immovable by
destination but that the sign faces and equipment remained
movables because they could be unbolted and removed without
any effect on the real property.
The court of appeal took a different approach and, treating
the whole sign structure as a single entity, classified it as an
immovable by nature as constituting a "construction" within
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 157 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
2. 162 So. 2d 160 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), rehearing denied, writ refused,
164 So. 2d 352.
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the meaning of Civil Code article 464, and a part of the landed
estate quoad the purchaser without recorded notice of the lease.
It is not clear to what extent this holding is predicated upon
the fact that the plaintiff's lease was unrecorded and not bind-
ing on the vendee-defendant. For purposes of immovable classi-
fication under article 464 there is no question of ownership of
the building or construction, or unity of ownership with the
land.3 If the lease had been recorded, it would have constituted
a constructive notice to the purchaser, and the court would prob-
ably not have reached the same decision.
OWNERSHIP
Lake versus River or Stream
Many rules of property law pertain to land in the vicinity of
water, including land adjacent to or under water, and deal with
changes from submerged to emerged land (and vice versa).
These rules often vary according to the nature of the body of
water, especially the degree to which it is navigable. Of prime
importance is the legal distinction between a river or stream
and a lake. This classification is not necessarily coincident with
the name on a map, nor is it governed by dictionary definitions
or the tests of geologists or historians: it is a legal classification
made by courts in order to determine which property laws are
applicable to the case. With the wide range of different kinds
of bodies of water in Louisiana, there seems to be no end to the
problems of their classification - unless the latest case will be
of substantial help on that issue.
State v. Cockrell4 pivoted on the problem of classifying the
body of water known as Six Mile Lake: was it a "lake" or a
"river or stream" for legal purposes? In the latter case, the
property rules of accession in relation to alluvion 5 would apply;
in the former, they would not. Within relatively recent years,
several cases 6 have dealt with this question, but the present case
3. Scardino v. Maggio, 131 So. 217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930) ; Vaughn v.
Kemp, 4 La. App. 682 (2d Cir. 1926).
4. 162 So. 2d 361 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), writ refused, "no error of law,"
246 La. 343, 164 So. 2d 350.
5. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 509, 510 (1870).
6. Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882) ; State v. Erwin,
173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931) ; Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315(1936) ; Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14 So. 2d
61 (1943) ; Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 233 La. 915, 98 So. 2d 236 (1957)
State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 787, 20 So. 2d 136 (1944).
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provides the occasion for the most comprehensive contribution
to the law on the subject. In deciding that Six Mile Lake was
a "river or stream" within the meaning of Civil Code article
509, the court made a thorough survey of the jurisprudence and
established a substantial number of objective physical factors,
which, it is hoped, will facilitate the answers to future questions
of the same sort. The matter is fully discussed elsewhere in this
Review.7
USUFRUCT
In State v. Costello,8 the husband as surviving spouse was
perfect owner of an undivided one-half interest in certain realty
and usufructuary of the other half to which his children had
the naked ownership. When the Department of Highways ex-
propriated this property and deposited the money in court, the
children claimed their half. They contended that the usufruct
had terminated by "the loss of the thing subject to the usufruct"
under Civil Code article 613, but the court properly held that
this was not a loss of the property within the contemplation of
the article. The father was entitled to have the usufruct of his
wife's half of the community until his death or remarriage,9 and
the expropriation merely changed the base of his right from
the property to the proceeds. Consequently, the father was en-
titled to receive one-half of the money as his own, and the other
half as usufructuary. The children's rights as naked owners of
this half were changed from the direct right in the property of
a perfect usufruct to the claim for restoration of the same sum
of money at the termination of what had become an imperfect
usufruct.10
The problems concerning the partition of land subject to a
usufruct are varied. The owner of an undivided share in the
naked ownership can obtain a partition, by licitation if neces-
sary." By the same reasoning, the owner of an undivided share
in the usufruct might obtain a partition by licitation, 12 if it is
not feasible for him to get an identified share of the enjoyment
and fruits. But the naked owner cannot demand a partition
against the usufructuary because they are not co-owners of the
7. See Note, 25 LA. L. REV. 554 (1965).
8. 158 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
9. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 916 (1870).
10. Id. arts. 534, 549 (1870).
11. Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908).
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1309 (1870).
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same property interest.13 In Fricke v. Stafford,14 a partition
of realty was demanded by a person who had an undivided in-
terest in the perfect ownership of a tract of land, and at the
same time he also had an undivided interest in the naked owner-
ship of the remaining fraction of the same land. The court held
that he could not obtain a partition by licitation as long as an
undivided portion of the property was subject to a valid usu-
fruct. A fuller analysis and critical evaluation of this problem
has been published elsewhere in this Review. 15
In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Boudoin,1e a man sold by
warranty deed to a child of his second marriage certain prop-
erty which had been acquired during his first marriage. There
was an unconditional acceptance of his succession by all the
children of both marriages. Then the children of the first mar-
riage claimed as belonging to them what had been their mother's
half of the community and on which the father had enjoyed a
legal usufruct. The problems involved are complicated; after
a hearing, a rehearing, and a denial of further rehearing, the
court rendered judgment sustaining the ownership of the son-
vendee. It is not feasible in these comments to discuss fully all
the issues involved, especially all the criss-crossing arguments
about warranty and estoppel; but there is a point concerning
usufruct that should be clarified.
When Pierre Boudoin's first wife died, he acquired the usu-
fruct of her undivided half of the property; and when he re-
married, this usufruct terminated. 1 7 At this point, he was under
an obligation to deliver to the children of the first marriage the
possession of their property because their previous naked owner-
ship had become perfect ownership. 8 Instead, he retained pos-
session and then sold the whole property to Leon Boudoin, a
son of his second marriage.
Insofar as the undivided half which was not his, and in which
he no longer had any legal property interest, the father's sale
was null and conveyed nothing.19 At that point, the children of
13. Kaffie v. Wilson, 130 La. 350, 57 So. 1001 (1911).
14. 159 So. 2d 52 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
15. Note, 24 LA. L. REV. 885 (1964).
16. 154 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), writ refused, "no error of law,"
245 La. 54, 156 So. 2d 601.
17. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 916 (1870).
18. Id. arts. 533, 535, 625.
19. Id. art. 2452.
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the first marriage could have claimed their property, as well as
damages against the father for his failure to restore possession
to them and for his wrongful disposition. The court's statement
that "they certainly could not seek from him [the father] the
return of their interest in the property. He never owned
it ... .-"20 fails to separate the concept of possession from that of
ownership. And by continuing with the statement that "the
only possible recourse which the six heirs had against Pierre
Boudoin was to seek whatever money damages they had suffered
by reason of this attempted sale of their property, 2 1 the court
consolidated the oversight of the father's obligation to deliver
the possession of the property to its legal owners. On the face
of the court's statement, a usufructuary would have the choice
of delivering possession to the naked owners or of selling the
property and paying damages. This passes over too blithely the
vital issue of title to the property itself.
The argument is made that a co-owner in indivision may
possess the whole property, and therefore as co-owner the father
was not under any obligation to deliver possession to the chil-
dren. However, there are two fallacies in this reasoning: (1)
the father is not only a co-owner but also a former usufructuary,
and his position as co-owner does not extinguish his obligations
as former usufructuary; and (2) while a co-owner in indivision
may possess the whole property, he has no protected right to do
so, because the other co-owner can demand partition at any
time.
When a person makes a warranty sale of property belonging
to another, he conveys nothing because the sale is null.22 The
real owner can reclaim his property from the vendee, and the
vendor's warranty obligation is resolved in damages in favor
of the vendee. 23 The vendee does not have the choice of either
keeping the property or claiming damages.
It is then argued that when the children of the first mar-
riage unconditionally accepted their father's succession, they
became "estopped" to claim their property. Estoppel is not a
part of the Louisiana civil law, and the source references are to
its home in the common law. This does not preclude the pro-
20. 154 So. 2d at 249.
21. Ibid.
22. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2452 (1870).
23. Ibid.
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priety of utilizing the concept of estoppel in situations where
there are gaps in our law24 for which estoppel provides a socially
desirable solution in conformity with the express Louisiana
law. In the case under discussion, there are express rules of
Louisiana law which oblige a usufructuary to deliver possession
of the property at the termination of the usufruct,25 which de-
clare null the sale of the property of another, 26 and which pro-
vide for restitution of the price and for damages against a war-
ranty-vendor who does not convey any title.27 In the presence
of these express rules of Louisiana law, it is neither necessary
nor appropriate to reach for solutions in the common law or
any other source. As for the heritable obligations of uncondi-
tional heirs, that is a subsequent and separate issue, and the
vendee's recovery should be limited to a restitution of the price,
because the vendee-son Leon must have known all the facts of
the family history and relationships; and since ignorance of the
law is no excuse, he should not be entitled to recover any dam-
ages resulting from his invalid purchase because he could not
assert that he "knew not that the thing belonged to another
person." 28
In the last paragraph of Judge Tate's concurring opinion
on rehearing, he invited a showing that "the father was at the
time of his death under a duty to restore to the six major heirs
their property." The answer to this inquiry lies in separating
the concepts of "possession" and "title" to the property in ques-
tion. Of course, the father never had title to the share of which
the children were naked owners, but he was in lawful possession
as usufructuary, and he was under a duty to deliver the pos-
session to the naked owners at the termination of his usufruct.
This obligation is not extinguished by his separate status as a
co-owner in indivision.
SERVITUDES
When a right of way is established in a "right of way deed,"
it must be ascertained whether this creates only a servitude or
whether there is a conveyance of full ownership. In the absence
of an express or clear intent to transfer title, the grant is inter-
24. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 21 (1870).
25. Id. arts. 533, 535, 645.
26. Id. art. 2452.
27. Id. arts. 2506, 2452.
28. Id. art. 2452.
29. 154 So. 2d at 253.
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preted as a servitude. A significant point in this determination
is that a servitude is extinguished by ten years non-use,80 re-
storing perfect ownership to the proprietor, whereas an owner
of property does not lose any of his rights by mere non-use.3'
Since the grant in both cases constitutes a giving up of certain
property interests, it is proper to interpret any doubt or am-
biguity in favor of the landowner rather than in favor of the
grantee. These principles were reviewed and considered in the
case of Mitchel v. Board of Commissioners of the Jefferson and
Plaquemines Drainage District32 and applied to the public agency
in the same way as between private individuals.
In Nelson v. Warren,3 3 there was a community driveway
between two properties, and at the request of the defendant
the trial court had relocated the servitude entirely on the de-
fendant's property leading directly into the defendant's new car-
port, and on the defendant's side of a fence which defendant
constructed down the middle of the original driveway. This
required plaintiff to cross over at an angle from defendant's
property to reach his own garage, and the court of appeal
agreed with the plaintiff that this would not be "equally con-
venient" within the meaning of Civil Code article 777. Accord-
ingly, the defendant was ordered to remove the fence and to
permit the continued use of the community drive in its original
location.
Only by reference to each situation can it be determined
when the acts of one proprietor in the use of his property "may
be the cause of any damage" to his neighbor, within the mean-
ing of Civil Code article 667, or when the action is permissible
within article 668 "although it should occasion some incon-
venience." (Emphasis added.) In Williams v. Beverly,34 the de-
fendant constructed an unsightly fence on his own side of the
property line but made it look as if it were the plaintiff's fence.
The plaintiff's demand for its removal was refused. The signifi-
cance of this decision as a contribution to the law is in the dis-
tinction between this fact situation and that in the prior case of
Parker v. Harvey.35 In the Parker case, the fence was ordered
30. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 789 (1870).
31. Id. art. 496.
32. 161 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
33. 157 So. 2d 762 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
34. 160 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
35. 164 So. 507 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
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removed because it was shown to have an injurious effect on
the plaintiff's business, while not serving as any benefit to the
defendant. In the Williams case, the court found no interference
or injury to the plaintiff, whereas there was reason to expect
that the fence would serve some useful purpose with respect to
controlling children and pets.
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
Prior to 1960, one objecting landowner could enforce a valid
building restriction against another owner who had committed,
or was about to commit, a violation within the subdivision af-
fected. By Act 448 of 1960, amending R.S. 9:5622, the legisla-
ture empowered the owners of a majority of the square footage
of the land in a subdivision to terminate a restrictive covenant
under certain conditions. An individual is no longer assured
of the protection he counted on, and to this extent his property
interest is subject to the decision of a majority of his neighbors.
It is not surprising that the constitutionality of the statute was
attacked in Johnston v. Frantom,6 but it is surprising that the
court should sustain the statute with merely the brief and blunt
statement that "the Act in question is not unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious. '3 7 Considering the importance always attached to
the rights of private property, and the deprivation of the prop-
erty interest of the objecting minority landowners, the question
of the constitutionality of the statute merits at least something
of a judicial discussion in support of the first affirmative con-
clusion on this issue. 3
In Willis v. New Orleans East Unit of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses,39 there was a large subdivision containing several hun-
dred lots with a restrictive covenant limiting construction to
single-family dwellings for residential purposes. Thereafter,
every one of the landowners gave written consent to exclude
two of the original squares from this restriction in order to
permit use of the land for a church and a school. Sometime
later, another religious denomination proposed to construct a
church on a lot within this subdivision, claiming that the re-
36. 159 So.2d 404 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
37. Id. at 405.
38. In In re Congregation of St. Rita Roman Catholic Church, 130 So. 2d 425,
428 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), this question was expressly pretermitted because
Act 448 of 1960 had no application there.
39. 156 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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striction against the construction of a church had been waived
by all the parties. However, the injunction against them was
sustained. The earlier waiver was only a single instance of
departure from the residential covenant out of several hundred
lots in the subdivision; this could certainly not be evaluated
as substantially defeating the general plan.
In Leonard v. Lavigne,40 there was a recorded lease in which
the landowner bound himself, and his heirs and assigns, not to
make competitive use of any of his adjacent property. This
stipulation was breached, and the question was whether the
restriction was a covenant running with the land or merely a
personal obligation. The trial court said it was merely a per-
sonal obligation; the court of appeal held it was a covenant
running with the land. The Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court, finding that the court of appeal had
relied on common law sources. The Supreme Court stressed the
reminder that "while these rules of common law jurisprudence
are sometimes persuasive, they are not controlling under our
system of civil law, particularly since we have codal provisions
that are to the contrary."4'
There is the "real obligation" which attaches to immovable
property under Civil Code article 2010, but the lease provi-
sion in the case under discussion was clearly a personal obliga-
tion. Building restrictions are recognized as limitations on the
use of land and are likened to servitudes, but real servitudes
constitute relationships between estates belonging to different
owners and cannot exist between a lessor and lessee.
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTS
In Succession of Anderson' the validity of a statutory will
was contested on the ground that it had not been signed by the
testator. The testament contained the testator's declaration that
40. 245 La. 1004, 162 So. 2d 341 (1964), reversing 153 So. 2d 544 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1963).
41. Id. at 1007, 162 So. 2d at 343.
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 159 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
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